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Modern-day distributed systems have been increasing in complexity and dynamism due
to the heterogeneity of the system execution environment, different network technologies,
online repairs, frequent updates and upgrades, and the addition or removal of system
components. Such complexity has elevated the operational and maintenance costs and
triggered efforts to reduce it while improving its reliability.
Availability is the ratio of uptime to total time of a system. A High Available system,
or systems with at least 99.999% of Availability, imposes a challenge to maintain such
levels of uptime. Prior work shows that by using system state monitoring and fault
management with failure detectors it is possible to increase system availability.
The main objective of this work is to develop an Eventually Perfect Failure Detector to
improve a database system Availability through fault-tolerance methods. Such a system
was developed and tested in a proposed High-Availability database access infrastructure.
Final results have shown that is possible to achieve performance and availability im-
provements by using, respectively, replication and a failure detector.
Keywords: Distributed systems, failure detection, high availability
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Resumo
Os Sistemas distribuídos modernos têm aumentando em dinamismo e complexidade dev-
ido à heterogeneidade do ambiente de execução, diferentes tecnologias de rede, manutenção
online, atualizações frequentes e a adição ou remoção de componentes do sistema. Esta
complexidade tem elevado os custos operacionais e de manutenção, incentivando o desen-
volvimento de soluções para reduzir a manutenção dos sistemas enquanto melhora sua
confiabilidade.
Disponibilidade é a razão do tempo de atividade sobre um intervalo de tempo to-
tal. Sistemas de Alta Disponibilidade, ou seja, que possuem pelo menos 99.9999% de
Disponibilidade, representam um grande desafio para manter tais níveis de operacionali-
dade. Trabalhos anteriores mostram que é possível melhorar a Disponibilidade do sistema
utilizando o monitoramento de estados do sistema e o gerenciamento de falhas com de-
tectores.
O objetivo principal deste trabalho é desenvolver um Detector de Falhas Eventual-
mente Perfeito que pode melhorar a Disponibilidade de um sistema de base de dados
através de uma arquitetura de Alta Disponibilidade.
Os resultados finais mostram que é possível ter ganhos de desempenho e disponibili-
dade utilizando, respectivamente, métodos como replicação e detecção de falhas.
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A distributed system can be viewed as a set of hardware or software components, located
at networked computers, that communicate and coordinate their action only by exchang-
ing messages. From this definition one can derive three main characteristics of distributed
systems, namely: (i) components concurrency; (ii) lack of global clock; (iii) independent
components failures [1].
Availability is defined as the probability that a system is operating satisfactory at any
point in time under stated conditions or the ratio of up time to total time [2]. A High
Available system is one that can deliver at least 99.999% of Availability, bounded to a
maximum of 5 minutes of downtime when considering a whole year of system activity [3].
1.1 Theoretical framework
Modern-day distributed systems have been increasing in complexity and dynamism due
to the heterogeneity of the system execution environment, different network technologies,
online repairs, frequent updates and upgrades, and the addition or removal of system
components. Such complexity has elevated the operational and maintenance costs and
triggered efforts to reduce the system maintenance time and costs while improving its
reliability, also referred as Availability [2][4].
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Prior work was done to increase system Availability through system state monitoring
and fault management with failure detectors, applying counter measures that could help
guarantee that the system properly provides its services [4].
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this work is to develop an Eventually Perfect Failure Detector and
test it in a High-Available infrastructure. Starting from the main objective the following
specific objectives were derived:
• Introduce and set up and high available architecture for database access.
• Explore the architecture in order to verify its performance with different layouts
and identify its limitations in terms of failure detection.
• Implement a failure detection module and add it to the architecture in order to
mitigate possible unwanted events by using failure detection.
1.3 Document Structure
After the introduction, this document is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces
the fundamental concepts behind failure detection, types of failures, failure detectors
and provides a background overview of the communication methods used in this project;
Chapter 3 introduces a high available architecture and discusses its performance and
limitation in terms of failure detection; Chapter 4 explores the implementation details of
an eventually perfect failure detector and its integration with a database proxy; Chapter 5




This chapter introduces the fundamental theories behind failure detection by presenting
the concept of a fault-tolerant system on Section 2.1, classifying types of failures on
Section 2.2 and discussing metrics for how a system operational state can be measured
on Section 2.3. On Section 2.4 it is presented the concept of an unreliable failure detector
along with its different types, and at Section 2.5 the network communication tools used
on this project are discussed.
2.1 Fault-Tolerant Systems
A distributed system can be viewed as a set of hardware or software components, located
at networked computers, that communicate and coordinate their action only by exchang-
ing messages [1]. Such components could be subject to individual failures. Thus it is
necessary that system designers have ways to express and properly handle such behavior.
A system is said to be fault-tolerant when, in case of a component failure, it exhibits
a well-defined failure behavior or the system masks component failures to users [5]. De-
signing fault-tolerant systems can be a difficult task as it is necessary to understand and
control all of the individual components aspects when they are properly functioning as
well, in some more complex case, when there is a probability of a component failure.
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Thus, to design a fault-tolerant system it is necessary to have a good definition of
how the system and its components could depend on different components or even on
different systems, and to have a model for expressing such dependencies and behavior on
its architecture.
A model introduced by Cristian [5] states that systems architectures can be explained
in terms of service, server and a depends upon relation. A specification defines what
operations a component is able to do and a component that provides a set of operations,
i.e. a service, through a given input, is called a server. A server u depends upon a server
r if the correctness of u behavior depends on the correctness of r behavior. In this case,
the server u is said to be an user, (i.e. a client), of r, while r is said to be a resource
of u. It is important to point out that such depends upon relation is not about flow of
execution but dependency on the correctness of the server component. This abstraction
in terms of services, servers and clients can be extensible to both software and hardware
domains [5].
2.2 Failure Classification
A fault (or failure) can be either a hardware defect or a software/programming mistake
(bug) whereas an error is a manifestation of the fault/failure/bug. Both failure and
error can spread through the system and potentially propagate itself as other components
could depend directly, or indirectly, on the output or even on the proper functional state
of another component [6].
In order to mitigate and limit error and failure propagation, systems designers incor-
porate fault containment zones into the system. A fault containment zone is a concept
by which components prone to error or failure can be isolated in order to prevent direct
dependency of another component for proper functioning. Fault containment zones are
implemented by using component redundancy and some agreement based on the output
of other components [5][6].
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Failures can be classified according to several aspects. To start with, they may be
hardware or software related. In the context of this work, only software failures are
considered.
Regarding their duration, failures can be classified into permanent, transient, or in-
termittent [6]. A permanent failure reflects the permanent absence or malfunctioning of
a component. A transient failure is one that causes a component to malfunction for some
arbitrary period of time and after such period the functionally is restored again. An in-
termittent failure is one that it never goes away but it oscillates on being active, when a
component malfunctions, or inactive, when a component is working properly.
Concerning their behavior, failures can be classified as: timing failure when, although
correct, the output fails to come in the specified time interval; response failure when
the component output, or its state, is incorrect; omission failure when the component
somehow omits response to an input; crash failure when the component is unable to
respond until it is restarted [5].
A failure can also be categorized as benign or malicious. A benign failure causes a
component to go dead and, by consequence, could be easier to detect and deal with.
A malicious (or Byzantine) failure causes a component, although looking functional, to
produce erroneous output to the system and propagating the failure [6].
2.3 Reliability, Availability and Serviceability (RAS)
To get a view of the system life-cycle it is necessary to collect data about the system
state and to have ways for categorization and comparison. Availability, Reliability and
Serviceability are metrics that represent an effort to quantify how a system is expected to
function over some period of time.
Reliability, denoted as R(t), is the probability of a system being up, continuously, in
the time interval [0, t]. This measure is suitable for systems in which even a momentary
disruption can prove costly [6]. Related to reliability there are Mean Time to Failure
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(MTTF), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF),
where the latter is derived from MTBF = MTTF + MTTR.
Availability, denoted by A(t) and calculated by A = MTTF ÷MTBF, is the average
fraction, often presented as a percentage, of time over the interval [0, t] that the system is
up. This measure is appropriate for applications in which continuous performance is not
vital but where it would be expensive to have the system down for a significant amount
of time [6].
A High-Available system is one that can deliver 99.999% of Availability. As shown
on Table 2.1, for a system to be considered High-Available, there is a need for fewer
failures and fast repair time as the downtime decreases in orders of magnitude from a
class to another [3].
System Type Downtime (min/year) Availability Class
unmanaged 50,000 90% 1
managed 5,000 99% 2
well-managed 500 99,9% 3
fault-tolerant 50 99,99% 4
high-availability 5 99,999% 5
very-high-availability .5 99,9999% 6
ultra-availability .05 99,99999% 7
Table 2.1: Availability classes
Serviceability refers to the ease of performing diagnosis and repair of a system. It
is also referred to as the maintainability of a system. In a more broader definition,
maintainability accounts for the probability of a successful corrective maintenance action
within a specified period of time and also taking into consideration all of the technical
know-how, and human resources (if necessary), needed in the action as a whole [7].
Systems, or even components, can be composed of multiple elements. Thus it can be
hard to calculate the discussed metrics and to define whether a system, or component, has
failed when one of its parts has failed or when all of its parts has failed. Some threshold
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could be applied but, still, there is not a consensus about how such threshold should be
effectively calculated.
2.4 Failure Detectors
As coordination happens by passing messages over a network, and there is no physical
global clock, distributed systems have an intrinsic asynchronous behavior. Thus, the
global state of a distributed computation is derived from the state of all processes and
communication channels involved [8].
This asynchronous characteristic, as proved by Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [9], im-
poses an impossible solution for consensus and atomic broadcast problems, with the former
being a problem where reliable processes over a distributed network must agree on the
same value or state, and the latter a problem where all correct processes receive the same
set of messages in the same sequence. Such impossibility, in a totally asynchronous model
of computation, happens due to the difficulties in determining whether a process has
crashed, i.e. is unreliable, or it is only taking a considerable amount of time to respond.
To tackle this problem, Chandra and Toueg [10] augmented the asynchronous model
of computation by recognizing its limitations and allowing mistakes to be made by an
external failure detector mechanism. Such augmentation introduced the concept of a
unreliable failure detector model where each process of the distributed system has access
to a local failure detector module. The failure detector module works by maintaining a list
of suspected crashed processes and by later removing them from the list in case it believes
that the suspecting was a mistake.
Chandra and Toueg [10] characterized eight different classes of failure detectors in
respect to its completeness and accuracy. Completeness requires that a failure detector
eventually must suspect every process that crashed. Accuracy restricts the flexibility that
the failure detector has to make mistakes (e.g. when a correct process suspects another
correct process).
In respect to Completeness, there are two types:
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• Strong: where every crashed processes is, eventually, permanently suspected by
every correct processes.
• Weak: where every crashed processes is, eventually, permanently suspected by some
correct processes.
Supplementary to Completeness there is Accuracy and this can be of four types:
• Strong: where correct processes are never suspected by any correct processes.
• Weak: where some correct processes are never suspected by any correct processes.
• Eventual Strong: where there is a time after which correct processes are not sus-
pected by any correct processes.
• Eventual Weak: where there is a time after which some correct processes are not
suspected by any correct processes.
In summary, with Chandra and Toueg [10] classification based on accuracy and com-
pleteness, failure detectors can be one of the categories shown on Table 2.2.
Types of Failure Detectors Completeness Accuracy
Perfect (P ) Strong Strong
Eventually Perfect (P ) Strong Eventually Strong
Strong (S) Strong Weak
Eventually Strong (S) Strong Eventually Weak
Weak (W ) Weak Weak
Eventually Weak (W ) Weak Eventually Weak
Quasi-Perfect (ϑ) Weak Strong
Eventually Quasi-Perfect (ϑ) Weak Eventually Strong
Table 2.2: Types of Failure Detectors according to its level of completeness and accuracy
Chandra and Toueg [10] also defined how failure detectors can be equivalent with each
other by exploring the concept of reducibility, where a failure detector D′ is reducible to a
failure detector D if there is a distributed algorithm that can transform D into D′ which,
in that case, D′ is said to be weaker than D. Thus, with reduction, anything that can
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be done using the failure detector D′ can also be accomplished by using the D failure
detector.
Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [11] introduced the concept of partially synchronous
failure detector model, relaxing the asynchronous assumptions of the failure detector
model and allowing a common notion of time between processes through the use of time-
outs where one could assume that failed processes would trigger the algorithm about its
failure given enough time.
2.4.1 Propagation of Failure Information
Acknowledging the implementation difficulties of a partially synchronous model, Felber,
Défago, Guerraoui, et al. [12] identified how information about failure of a component is
propagated through the system, i.e flow policy, and defined protocols such as push model,
pull model and push-pull model.
In the push model protocol, monitorable objects, i.e. parameters than can be monitored,
are active and periodically send heartbeat messages to inform that they are still alive. If
a monitor, i.e. a failure detector, fails to receive any heartbeat from a monitorable object
within a specific time bound, then it starts to suspect that the object has failed. After
receiving a message from an observable, the monitor sets a timer that should trigger in
case the next messages are not received. In this model only one-way messages are sent in
the system and multicast can be used in case there are multiple monitors [12].
In the pull model protocol, monitor objects send liveness requests to monitored ob-
jects. When a liveness request is received, monitorable objects should reply informing the
monitor that they are still alive [12].
In the push-pull model protocol, or dual model, the protocol has two phases. In the
first phase, the monitor assumes that all of the monitored objects are using the push
model, so it expects to receive heartbeat messages. On the second phase, the monitor
switches the model for processes that didn’t send heartbeat messages and assumes that
such processes are using the pull model so they must be expecting for liveness request in
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order to respond to the monitor. If no responses are sent to the monitor then the process
is suspected [12].
2.5 Tools
Process communication through networks relies on datagram and streaming Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) and provides the base for building different communica-
tion protocols and higher-level communication systems. Following is an overview of the
fundamental network communication methods that are present, whether indirectly, when
they area abstracted by some other high level application, (such as the proxy or database
layer), or directly, when there is as need to handle low-level details (such as timeouts,
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and port numbers).
2.5.1 TCP
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a communication protocol used for stream
sockets. TCP provides a sophisticated transport service by supplying a reliable, connection-
oriented, bidirectional, byte-stream communication channel and stream-based program-
ming abstraction between two endpoints. A TCP endpoint is represented by the infor-
mation maintained by the operating system for one end of a TCP connection as well as
the send and receive buffers and the state information used to synchronize the operation
between the two connected endpoints [13].
As TCP is connection-oriented, before any data transfer begins, the sending and re-
ceiving process need to establish a bidirectional reliable communication channel. Through
this channel the processes can read and write to each other any time during the connec-
tion period, and intermediate nodes are aware of the TCP connections even though the
IP packets carrying the data could follow different routes to its destination [1].
To guarantee that bytes sent by the sender process arrive without errors, and are
assembled in the original order, TCP has error-detection and sequencing features. In
order to handle errors, the data is broken into segments with a checksum so that the
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receiver process can check if there is any error at some specific segment. When checking
for segment errors the receiver endpoint must acknowledge when data is fine or discard it
otherwise. If the sender endpoint does not receive any acknowledgement for a particular
segment, due to errors or a timeout, then it must send that same segment again until it
receives the acknowledgment.
To ensure the order of segments over a TCP connection, each segment is assigned
a logical sequence number indicating the position of that segment in the data stream
for the connection. With the sequence number, the receiver is able to assemble the TCP
segments in the correct order and pass them as a byte stream to the application layer. The
sequence number is also used as an acknowledgment to the sender so that both endpoints
know exactly which segments have failed and needs to be sent again. TCP also has flow
and congestion controls to prevent that the number of drop segments or segment re-sends
increases due to the heterogeneity of the underlying network [13].
In conclusion, TCP is a reliable way of transmitting data between two endpoints.
Due to TCP built-in error checking and resend of failed segments, it is a good tool for
applications such as file transfer and games.
2.5.2 UDP
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a communication protocol used for datagram sockets.
UDP is neither connection-oriented nor offers any kind of reliability. Thus the message
could be corrupted or may not ever arrive at the destination. With UDP, if reliability is
needed, it must be implemented at the application level [13].
To send or receive UDP messages a process must create a datagram socket bound
to an IP address and a local port. When working as a server the process must bind its
socket to a local port (i.e., select a particular port) where it could listen for some client
messages sent to the server. A Client binds its socket to any free local port (i.e. ephemeral
port) and every exchanged messages contains the IP address and port number, of both
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the sender and the receiver, so that the transport-layer is aware of the communication
endpoints and the client can reply to the server whenever needed [1].
Despite UDP intrinsic unreliability, there are some characteristics that makes it a valid
option depending on the application domain:
• As UDP does not need to neither establish nor close a connection, it can be faster
than TCP. When some error occurs UDP will not try to resend the invalid messages
as in TCP [13].
• With UDP sockets is possible to use broadcast and multicast addressing methods.
Broadcast permits a sender to transmit a datagram, to the same destination port,
on every host of a connected network. Multicast allows a sender to transmit a
datagram, to the same destination port, on a specified group (i.e. set of hosts) [13].
• Applications that can accept the loss or corruption of some messages such as audio
and video streaming can be implemented with UDP.
2.5.3 Message Queues
Message Queue is an Inter-Process Communication (IPC) that provides a point-to-point
service using the concept of a queue in which processes can consume messages, (e.g.
allowing a processes to exchange data in the form of messages), and with that achieving
space and time decoupling. A producer process can send message to a determined queue
and some consumer process can read messages from this queue. Queues normally work
on an First-In-First-Out (FIFO) order, but message queues implementations can support
other policies such as priority, where higher-priority messages are delivered first [1]. With
regard to client processes, the reading of a message from a queue can follow different
styles:
• Blocking Receive: block until a message is available.
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• Non-Blocking Receive: also referred as polling operation, constantly checks the sta-
tus of the queue returning a message if available or some kind of unavailable indi-
cation otherwise.
• Notify Operation: an event is issued whenever a message is available for consumption
on a queue.
Messages are persistent until its consumption, thus asserting that messages will, even-
tually, be delivered, although it is not possible to make assumptions about the precise
time. Message Queue can also provide functionality such as: (i) transactions: where a
message could be part of a set of steps that needs to be fully completed in an atomic
fashion; (ii) transformations: where messages could be transformed to some other format
and with that deal with heterogeneity of data representations; (iii) security: where im-
plementations could offer support for authentication and confidentiality through Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) [1].
2.5.4 Group Communication
Group communication is a type of an indirect communication paradigm. Indirect com-
munication represents a communication between a sender entity and a set of receivers
through an intermediary element that avoids direct coupling by providing space and/or
time uncoupling. With space uncoupling, as sender and receivers do not have each other
identity, the system is flexible enough to support changes, update replications and migra-
tion of data. With time uncoupling neither sender nor receiver need to share the same life
cycle, giving the system the ability to deal with entities that can be active or inactive.
Time coupling generally means that messages should be persisted until the receiver (s)
are ready to receive the messages [1].
In a Group Communication service, messages are sent to a named group and later
are delivered to all members of the specified group. A group is an abstraction, generally
implemented over IP multicast, where the sender does not need to know any receiver
identity. Different implementations may have different group management policies, group
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membership services and failure detection according to the system needs [1]. The group
membership service has to deal with four main tasks:
• Group changes: provides an interface to create or destroy a group and also do add
or remove processes from groups.
• Failure Detection: monitoring of group members when they crash but also when
there is some communication failure; can mark a process as Suspected or Unsuspected
whenever there is a communication failure.
• Notification: notify group members whenever there is some some change in the
current state of the group (e.g. the group view has changed).
• Address Expansion: given a message and a group identifier, coordinates the multi-
cast delivery of the message to all of the group members.
As groups work over multicast communication, only one send operation is needed by
the application in order for the message to be sent to all the group members. This provides
better usage of bandwidth and relieve system designers from the burden to have to deal
with it [1].
2.5.5 Middleware
A Middleware is a software layer that provides a programming abstraction and masking
of the heterogeneity characteristics of underlying layers such as networks, hardware, oper-
ating systems and programming languages, by providing a uniform programming model,
such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC), Remote Method Invocation (RMI) among others,
that can be used by both servers and distributed applications designers in a more homo-
geneous environment where different systems can interact with each other even if their





This chapter introduces a high-availability architecture for database access that optimizes
performance and replication between databases. Such architecture was conceived taking
into account the possibility to replicate it in a real environment with available resources.
Section 3.1 describes the architecture’s individual elements. In Section 3.2, the different
types of component replication are discussed. Section 3.3 discusses the benchmark, the
underlying infrastructure and what software tools were used to collect performance metrics
from the system. Section 3.4 presents the benchmark results and threats to the validity
of the approach.
3.1 Architecture Overview
A high availability system architecture was conceived to gain insight into the implications
of such a system in a real scenario.
In the proposed architecture, shown in Figure 3.1, some application needs to access a
persistence layer and connects to it through a proxy layer, eliminating the need for it to
know about the internal topology of the persistence layer and/or its writable or readable
replicas.
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The data storage layer, in the context of this work, is made of four individual instances
of the MariaDB Relational Database Management System (RDBMS). The proxy layer,
with its two Apache Sharding Sphere instances, acts as a load balancer and failover layer
where, in case of a primary proxy failure, the secondary proxy could assume its role until
the primary becomes available again.
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Figure 3.1: High-Available Architecture
3.1.1 Apache ShardingSphere
Apache ShardingSphere is an open-source project that consist of a set of distributed
database middleware solutions namely: Sharding-JDBC, Sharding-Proxy and Sharding-
Sidecar. The goal of the ShardingSphere project is to provide functions for data shard-
ing, distributed transactions an database orchestration. Sharding-JDBC is an enhanced
Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) that is focused on high performance while main-
taining compatibility with all JDBC drivers frameworks. Sharding-Proxy is a transparent
database proxy, that provides a database server that encapsulates database binary pro-
tocols in order to support heterogeneous languages. It is possible to configure sharding
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without the need to apply vendor specific configurations to server databases. Sharding-
Sidecar, while still under development, is a cloud native database agent responsible for all
access to database in the form of a DaemonSet (Kubernets) for container platforms. It
provides a decentralized mesh layer that interacts with databases, i.e. a Database Mesh
or database grid [14].
Other proxy softwares were considered for this projects such as ProxySQL [15], de-
veloped in the C++ programming language; but, as the failure detector is developed in
Java programming language, the adoption of ProxySQL would require more complexity
on its integration with the failure detector as they are from distinct ecosystems. Apache
ShardingSphere was then chosen to reduce technical complexity by maintaining a single
development ecosystem as both the failure detector and the ShardingSphere proxy are
developed in Java programming language.
3.1.2 MariaDB
MariaDB is an open source RDBMS written in C and C++. It began as a fork of MySQL
after it was acquired by Oracle. As other RDBMS, MariaDB permits the creation and
management of relational databases by using Structured Query Language (SQL) queries
directly or by integration with some external applications. MariaDB has built-in support
for disaster recovering and high availability through fail-over and replication features. On
the security aspect MariaDB offers support for data encryption and even data obfuscation
for anonymization [16].
3.2 Replication Methods
By analyzing the architecture shown in Figure 3.1, when it comes to the application
communicating to the persistence layer, it is possible to note that all components have
replicas and there is not a single point of failure. Albeit this seems to suffice for a high-
available system there is also the need for a well defined course of action in case of a
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component failure. Such failure detection and response behavior is discussed in more
details for each layer below.
3.2.1 Proxy replication
The proxy layer is composed of Apache Sharding Sphere instances that need to be aware
of the persistence layer and each database instance. One individual proxy instance, orig-
inally, is not aware of other proxy instances and failure detection and response measures
needs to be done through multiple Domain Name System (DNS) records or virtual IP.
Without the failure detector, proxy instances are unable to detect database failures
causing the system to crash in subsequent accesses to a failed database. To mitigate such
problem, the failure detector module was later added to the proxy and databases in a way
that in the event of a database failure, the proxies, or even the other databases, could
dynamically activate or deactivate the failed database instances until it becomes func-
tioning again. This approach, albeit not perfect, contributes to the overall reliability and
availability of the system by reducing the impact and propagation of a failed component
as long as there are the minimum resources needed to guarantee the system functionality.
3.2.2 Database replication
At the persistence layer there are three different methods to achieve redundancy, namely
the asynchronous method, the semi-synchronous method and the synchronous
method.
On the asynchronous method only one database, the master, receive write statements
while it commits its changes to a binary log that later is read by the other databases
working as replicas. Such method, shown in Figure 3.2 (a), is good for read operations, as
adding new replicas does not add load to the whole system, but it is prone to information
loss in case the master fails and the replicas failed to complete the syncing process. With
the asynchronous method there is not failover and in case of a failure of the master another















Figure 3.2: Replication types (Adapted from MariaDB [17])
On the semi-synchronous method, a transaction is considered committed only after
it is committed in, at least, one of the replicas. Such method, shown in Figure 3.2 (b),
reduces the probability of data loss. In case of a failure, there still lacks an automatic
failover mechanism, so it is necessary to manually intervene, with the difference that only
the replicas synced with the master should be able to become the new master. This adds
more complexity to the maintainability of the system as there are 3 states to handle:
master, replica and semi-master.
Finally, on the synchronous method, all databases work as a master and there is no
need to transfer logs. In this project, such was achieved by, Galera Cluster [17] was used
to manage the synchronous replication throughout MariaDB nodes. The synchronization
happens by propagating changes, such as locks and data that needs to be replicated, as
they come, to other nodes through a dedicated communication channel. Galera Cluster,
shown in Figure 3.2 (c), uses a quorum-based failure detection system, and in order to
work properly and mitigate data inconsistency, it needs at least 3 nodes. That way,
Galera Cluster failure detection mechanism can apply the quorum-based state voting and
re-sync with other nodes as needed. This method is good for write and reading scaling




Galera Cluster [17], developed by Codeship, is a clustering solution for MySQL and Mari-
aDB databases. Galera Cluster offers support to synchronous multi-master database
replication based on InnoDB storage Engine. Multi-master clustering allows writes to
happen to any server that is part of the cluster without the need to deal with distributed
locking and shared resources management.
In practice a Galera Cluster consists in several database instances, (MySQL or Mari-
aDB) with the Galera Replication Plugin installed. This plugin implements the Write-Set
Replication (WSREP) API, which provides a certification-based replication as a trans-
action for replication, i.e. write-set, with rows to replicate and locks that were held by
database, sent between the nodes in the cluster. Each node certificates that the write-set
was replicated to other nodes and, at this is stage, the transaction is considered commit-
ted. In a scalability perspective the Galera Cluster also helps to boost performance by
allowing writes to every node in the cluster at the same time, as all nodes holds the same
data [17][18].
3.3 Benchmarks
Benchmarks makes possible to validate and collect metrics of a system performance. A
benchmark tool provides an environment that is stable, controlled and repeatable while
being flexible enough to handle different sets of configurations. This can help to ana-
lyze systems behavior, and potential bottlenecks, when subjected to different kinds of
workload.
To better understand the limitations and performance of the infrastructure the ar-
chitecture introduced on Figure 3.1 has been benchmarked with the TPC Benchmark C
(TPCC) [19].
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3.3.1 TPC Benchmark C
TPCC generates and evaluates an Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) workload. It is
a mixture of read-only and update intensive transactions that simulate the activities found
in complex OLTP application environments such as e-commerce. It does so by exercising
all of system components associated with such environments, which are characterized by:
• The simultaneous execution of multiple transaction types that explore different com-
plexities.
• On-line and deferred transaction execution modes.
• Multiple on-line terminal sessions.
• Moderate system and application execution time.
• Significant disk input/output.
• Transaction integrity (ACID properties).
• Non-uniform distribution of data access through primary and secondary key.
• Databases consisting of many tables with a wide variety of sizes, attributes, and
relationships.
• Contention on data access and update.
The performance metric reported by TPCC is a “business throughput” measuring the
number of orders processed per minute. Multiple transactions are used to simulate the
business activity of processing an order, and each transaction is subject to a response




OLTPBenchmark is a multi-threaded load generator framework. The framework is de-
signed to be able to produce a variable mixture load against any JDBC-enabled relational
database. The framework also provides data collection features, e.g., per-transaction-
type latency and throughput logs [20]. The OLTPBenchmark tool was chosen to run the
benchmarks due to its configuration flexibility, implementation of the TPCC Benchmark
and also for being database agnostic.
OLTPBenchmark has built-in support for the following benchmarks: TPCC,Wikipedia,
Synthetic Resource Stresser, Twitter, Epinions.com, TATP, AuctionMark, SEATS, YCSB,
JPAB (Hibernate), CH-benchmark, Voter, SIBench (Snapshot Isolation), SmallBank,
LinkBench.
Each benchmark can be parameterized through an Extensible Markup Language (XML)
file. On Appendix 1, the configuration used for the tests in this project is shown, with the
first 7 tags being for driver and connection specification as well as the level of transaction
isolation that database sessions should be open and following remaining tags being TPCC
specific. The <scalefactor> tag controls the size of the database. The <terminals>
tag controls the workload, or the number of clients, that would be generating traffic in the
system. The <works> tag is used to describe different types of tests that OLTPBench-
mark would perform by configuring the transaction rate (1000 in this case), the warm up
time before any metrics is done (100 in this case), and the time that the test should be
measured (200 in this case).
3.3.3 Test Scenarios
The test infrastructure is composed of 7 Virtual Machines (VMs) with 3.85 GB of RAM,
63 GB of SSD and 4 cores AMD EPYC 2.4 GHz processors each running Debian GNU/Linux
9 (stretch) as the operational system. Each machine has one specific service or has one
specific role and they were distributed as follow:
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• 4 VMs to compose the persistence layer by running instances of MariaDB Version
15.1 Distrib 10.1.37-MariaDB.
• 2 VMs to compose the proxy layer and dedicated to run Sharding Sphere proxy
instances.
• 1 VM is dedicated to generate the workload of the system through OLTPBenchmark.
All VMs were part of the same dedicated logical network (a specific VLAN) and were
interconnected by a single switch, as shown in Figure 3.3. Ping time of 0.529ms, 0.793ms,
1.784ms and 0.220ms for minimal, average, maximum and deviation, respectively, were









Figure 3.3: Virtual Machines infrastructure
The goal of the benchmarks on the high available architecture, introduced on Fig-
ure 3.1, is to get an overview of the its performance behaviour while exploring different
database layouts, by varying how many instances could be written or read from. Such
layouts are discussed in more details below.
Application connects directly to a database
The purpose of this layout, where an application bypasses the proxy by connecting directly
to a database, as shown on Figure 3.4, was to later be able to compare a direct connection





Figure 3.4: Test scenario using JDBC directly to a database
Application connects to a proxy with single database
The purpose of this second test scenario, shown in Figure 3.5, was to verify the per-
formance drawbacks that could exist by using a proxy as a middle layer between the





Figure 3.5: Test scenario using a proxy with one database
Application and Proxy with one master and one read replica
This third test scenario, as shown in Figure 3.6, was proposed to test how the system
could perform when writing to a single database instance (master) while being able to
read from two instances (one master and one replica).
Application with Proxy with two masters and two read replicas
This test scenario, shown in Figure 3.7, was proposed to test how the system could
perform when writing to two database instances (multi-masters) while being able to read

















Figure 3.7: Test scenario using a proxy with 2 masters and 2 replicas
3.3.4 Database configurations
Besides changing the layout of the architecture to test different behavior of the system
according to the use of database resources, by benchmarking it was identified that with
default configurations, MariaDB databases were not being stressed to its full capacity on
each machine. Such behavior negatively affected the initial tests as instances ended up
limiting and decreasing performance due to poor database configuration. To increase per-
formance some adjustments were made on parameters such as the number of connections;
transaction and statements timeout; concurrency handling; buffer and cache size of the
data storage engine. The final configuration file can be verified at Appendix 2.
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3.3.5 Running the Benchmarks
To analyze the architecture with different workloads the benchmarks were run by varying
the number of concurrent clients starting with 1, 2 and 4 threads and from that up to 128
threads, with 4 thread steps.
3.4 Results
After running the benchmarks with each of the different scenarios and varying the work-
load, the tpmC were collected and plotted on the graph shown on Figure 3.8. The
horizontal axis, named Terminals, represents the number of concurrent clients and, the
vertical axis, named Throughput, represents the number of transactions. Each line of
the graph represents the throughput achieved by a different configuration layout for a
different number of active concurrently clients (terminals).




















Figure 3.8: Benchmark results
By observing the Figure 3.8 is possible to see that for the Direct JDBC line, which rep-
resents the configuration where the application connects directly to a single database thus
ignoring the proxy, the throughput reached its peak around 430 tx/s, and by comparing
with the Proxy JDBC line is possible to see that, in fact, the proxy adds a considerable
overhead (twice approximately) to the structure and had its throughput peak around 200
tx/s.
Comparing with other lines, Proxy JDBCMaster-Secondary and Proxy JDBC Sharding-
Master-Secondary, it is possible to see how the proxy could help with performance by
26
increasing the number of write and read instances. With Proxy JDBC Master-Secondary
writes happens exclusively at one database instance and reads happens exclusive on the
other database instance reaching its throughput around 1600 tx/s. Though, on Proxy
JDBC Sharding-Master-Secondary, when reading from 2 instances and writing to other
two instances the throughput reaches its peak at 7520 tx/s.
3.5 Threats to Validity
Although databases were configured in a production fashion and the environment was
controlled to its best, there are some important considerations about the results:
• All VM were sharing the same storage through a unique ZFS+NAS partition that
was later subdivided for each individual virtual machine.
• All VMs shared a dedicated a 128 GB RAM for cache. Such amount would be more
than enough to hold all the data from tables used on the benchmark. This could
had a significant impact in the final results as the need for round trips to the disk
would be reduced or even eliminated.
• Each node has a network transmission capacity of 1 Gbit/s and were in the same
environment. On a considerable more physically distributed environment database
synchronization and access could have a more unstable response time.
Such observations are relevant as they could have had a considerable impact on the





Implementation of an Eventually
Perfect Failure Detector
As discussed on Chapter 2, the asynchronous characteristics of distributed systems poses a
challenge to software design and implementation due to the lack of global timing between
components which makes impossible to determine if a process has crashed (failed) or if
it is taking a considerable amount of time to process some input. With this problems in
mind, Chandra and Toueg [10], presented the concept of unreliable failure detectors that
permit some degrees of mistake in order to eventually reach synchrony.
This chapter presents the design and implementation details of a Eventually Perfect
Failure Detector using the Java Programming Language as well as the difficulties found
during the implementation.
4.1 Build and Implementation Tools
This section presents an overview of the tools used to control the artifacts generated
during the implementation of this project.
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4.1.1 Java Programming Language
Java is an object-oriented, general-purpose programming language [21]. It was designed
based on the concept of Write Once, Run Anywhere (WORA) by adding a dependency
of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Java code is compiled to a Bytecode format that
can run on any JVM regardless of the underlying computer architecture and/or operating
system.
The failure detector was implemented in Java due to its complete network API and
vast libraries that provides different distributed systems programming models through an
object-oriented programming abstraction.
4.1.2 Gradle
Gradle is an Open Source build automation tool focused on flexibility, by offering support
to expand itself, and performance by avoiding unnecessary work, running only tasks when
their inputs or outputs have changed. As Gradle runs on JVM it is possible to take
advantage of the whole Java API and run Gradle on a variety of platforms due to Java
extensive compatibility.
The Gradle building model is based on a set of tasks, or units of work, connected by
a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that describes all of the dependencies and the order of
execution. Tasks can be classified as: Actions: for works such as copying or compiling
files; Inputs: values, files and directories that actions use or operate on; Outputs: files
and directories that the actions modify or generate [22].
4.1.3 JFrog Artifactory
Artifactory is a JFrog product created to work as a binary repository manager [23]. A bi-
nary repository optimizes the software building process by storing the artifacts generated,
often on a binary format, by the building process. Artifactory centralizes this manage-
ment process and provides resources to better search, by adding meta-data to binaries
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and guarantee reliability of such artifacts by proving replication and security measures
such as authentication and encryption.
4.1.4 Apache ActiveMQ
Apache ActiveMQ is an open source software to build a multi-protocol, embedded, very
high performance, clustered, asynchronous messaging system. Apache ActiveMQ is an
example of Message Oriented Middleware (MoM), i.e. messaging system [24]. Messag-
ing system helps to reduce the heterogeneity between different systems on the network,
and to provide reliable, high available and an asynchronous messaging system. With its
configuration flexibility, Apache ActiveMQ has support for transport protocols namely:
OpenWire, Stomp, MQTT, AMQP, REST and WebSockets.
4.2 Design
Figure 4.1 represents a high level overview of the failure detector architecture and exposes
its internal logical units as individual blocks. At the base level there is the Failure
detector block which represents an unit of a failure detector process. A failure detector
process should be able to communicate to other failure detector processes in order to
build the knowledge about the system health as a whole and keep track of their individual
process health status, i.e. to know if a process has crashed or it is just taking some time
doing some computations.
Above the failure detector block there are the Channel and Probes blocks. The
Channel should provide a common API and serve as a conduit through which failure
detector processes can exchange messages, e.g. heartbeat messages, by using any kind
of communication method that can comply with the channel API. As an example there
is the UDP block in which processes communicate through UDP sockets, and there is
the ActiveMQ block in which processes exchange messages through message queues
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Figure 4.1: Failure detector block diagram
The Probes block should provide a common API for monitoring performance and
checking the health status of other system components by sending probe tests through
an end-to-end communication. A Probe test could be an e-mail message to test a mail
service; a web request to test a web server; a database query; ping or traceroute to test
network availability for example. By using test probes, the system can diagnosis the
root-cause of a performance degradation and take some necessary action.
4.3 Implementation details
The block diagram gave a high level overview of the individual logical units and its
responsibilities identified on the design phase. In this section the implementation aspects
are discussed in a more practical view, by presenting class diagrams and snippets of code,
for each logical unit, whenever necessary.
4.3.1 Failure Detector
The failure detector logical unit represents all of the essential features and behaviors of
a failure detector. By extracting those common features and behaviors, a class diagram,
as shown in Figure 4.2, was created. This diagram represents how the failure detector
module was implemented in this project.
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Figure 4.2: Failure detector class diagram
The fundamental functionalities of a failure detectors are represented by the Failure-
Detector interface. Its methods are:
• start and stop: methods to start and stop, respectively, the failure detector as well
as its internal services.
• startHeartbeat and stopHeartbeat: methods responsible for starting and stoping,
respectively, the heartbeat service of the failure detector.
• addSuspectListener and removeSuspectListener : methods responsible, respectively,
for adding or removing an object from the list of processes to be notified in case there
is an update of the suspects by the failure detector. Whenever this event is fired all
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of the SuspectListener objects receive, from the failure detector, the updated set of
the currently suspected processes.
• isSuspect: method to check if a given process is being suspected by the failure
detector.
• getLastHeartbeatFor : get a Date object representing when was the last heartbeat
of a given process.
• getSuspects: get the set of currently suspected processes.
• getProcess: get the process that represents the instance of the failure detector. Each
failure detector has a unique process representation.
• forceFail: method to force the failure detector to enter a failure state by broadcasting
a FailMessage to all peers listening on the channel. Each failure detector that
receives such message should add the source process into the set of suspected process.
• ressurect: method for the failure detector to inform that it is working correctly
by broadcasting a RessurectMessage to all peers listening on the channel. Each
failure detector that receives such message should remove the source process from
the set of suspected process.
The responsibility of maintaining the suspects list, and notify other failure detector
processes about failures, is taken by the abstract class AbstractFailureDetector. This
class also maintains a reference to a ProbeSampler object that handles the probes
activity. The class AbstractFailureDetector also provides a way to better control the
construction process of the object through the Builder pattern.
Heartbeat
Following the push model described by Felber, Défago, Guerraoui, et al. [12], this im-
plementation of an Eventually Perfect Failure Detector (P ) uses heartbeats to inform
about the functioning state. At some specified amount of time, the failure detector should
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broadcast heartbeat messages to other failure detector processes. In case of omission of
those messages, other failure detectors will start to suspect that the process has failed.
Figure 4.3 presents a class diagram of the classes involved on the failure detector heartbeat
activity.
Figure 4.3: Heartbeat class diagram
As shown on Figure 4.3, by implementing the Heartbeat interface and notifying the
HearbeatListeners, and by using the builder pattern, the abstract class Abstract-
Heartbeat makes it easy to implement different kinds of heartbeat behaviour.
The FixedPeriodHeartbeat, for example, implements the heartbeat behavior with
a fixed period of timeout. A ScheduledExecutorService, from Java 8 and java.utils
API, schedule the call of the notifyHeartbeatListeners method from AbstractHeart-
beat with a fix period of time. Whenever aHeartbeatListener receives such notification
it should fire its timeout (e: HeartbeatEvent) method, causing the failure detector to
broadcast instances of the class HeartbeatMessages to all of its known failure detector
processes, thus indicating that it is still alive.
Timeout
This implementation of the failure detector starts suspecting a process in a case a given
period of time has passed with no heartbeat message received from the given process. To
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better control how the failure detector would handle such scenario the timeout classes, as
shown on Figure 4.4, were implemented.
Figure 4.4: Timeout class diagram
By implementing the TimeoutGenerator interface and relying on the Builder pat-
tern the AbstractTimeoutGenerator abstract class provides a flexible way to imple-
ment different timeout policies that could, for example, be based on the mean time of
heartbeat messages, the longest timeout seen and so on. Failure detectors call the get-
Timeout () of a class whenever it needs a timeout value to trigger a new suspicion.
The FixedTimeoutGenerator class, uses a fixed timeout value passed through the
timeout (int timeout) method of the Builder. The final timeout, that will actually
be used, is then calculated by timeout = 2 ∗ timeout + 1.
4.3.2 Channel
The FailureDetector interface extends the ChannelListener interface in order to be
able to receive messages from the channel through the receive method. The Figure 4.5
gives a better view of the responsibilities of the channel as well as the types of messages
that could be exchanged on the channel.
The channel interface is responsible to provide a common way to start and stop a
communication channel, as well as to provide the ability to interact with it by sending
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Figure 4.5: Channel class diagram
messages and registering other objects that implements the ChannelListener interface, to
listen when new messages arrive on the channel. The abstract class AbstractChannel
is responsible to maintain the set of channel listeners and notify whenever there are new
messages. This class also provides a Builder inner class so that concrete implementations,
such as the DatagramChannel have more control over the building process. The Data-
gramChannel inherits the AbstractChannel and provides a communication channel
over UDP sockets. Other processes are added to the channel at the building phase and
the the channel keeps a map data structure with each process mapped to its IP address
and port number.
As shown in Figure 4.5, there are three types of messages, all of which inherits the
Message class, namely FailMessage, ResurrectMessage and HeartbeatMessage.
The FailMessage is used by a failure detector to force its failure, signalizing that it should
be considered to be failed by other failure detectors. The ResurrectMessage is used
by a failure detector to signal that its process should be considered alive by other failure
detectors and removed from the set of suspected processes. The HeartbeatMessage is
used by a failure detector to signal that its process is still alive. In case of omission then
the failure detectors starts to suspect the missing heartbeat process.
37
4.3.3 Probes
The Probes block should provide a common API for checking, i.e. probing, the liveness
of other system components. Such components could be a Domain Name System (DNS)
resolution, test reachability of a host through ping commands, and TCP connection es-
tablishment capabilities, for example. The liveness is a metric to let the system know the
health status of a system component by certifying that the given output is as expected
to be.
Figure 4.6: Probe class diagram
Figure 4.6 represents the class diagram of how the probe logic was implemented.
The common attributes and methods that a Probe should have are described by the
AbstractProbe class and the Probe interface.
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A concrete implementation of an AbstractProbe abstract class, needs to implement
the following methods:
• getId to get an identifier for the probe.
• addProbeListener and removeProbeListener : to register, or remove, an object to
receive a notification whenever a ProbeEvent is generated due to liveness update.
• getSamplingPeriod gets the period in which the probe do its sampling activity.
• sample defines what would be the probe sampling behaviour. It’s necessary that at
the end of the sampling the probe update the liveness status of the component or
aspect sampled. The values range from {0, 1} where 0 represents a fail during the
sampling and 1 represents a successful sample.
• liveness gets the currently liveness status from the probe. As said, is a value that
ranges from {0, 1}.
4.3.4 Curator
The curator class, as shown in Figure 4.7, was created to control what data sources are
available to be written or read by interacting with Apache Zookeeper and dynamically
change proxy configurations. Its dataSourcePaths and schemaName attributes holds
information about the proxy and its known data sources. Bellow is an overview of the
methods from Curator class:
Figure 4.7: Curator class diagram
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• stop and start: methods to start and stop the communication with Apache Zookeeper.
• createNode: creates a persistent node on Zookeeper on the given path.
• getData: get the data associated with the given path.
• getChildren: get all the children nodes of the parent node located at the given path.
• checkExists: checks if a given path exists on the Zookeeper.
• setData: associate data to a given path.
4.4 Architecture with Failure Detector
Database
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Figure 4.8: The architecture with Failure Detector
Figure 4.8 shows the final architecture but with the failure detector operating to-
gether on the database and proxy instances. Each failure detector instance is aware of
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all instances and are constantly sending heartbeats and suspecting processes accordingly.
Whenever some database unit is suspected, the failure detector deactivates its datasource
until the process is being suspected.
With future implementation of SQL probes, it would be possible to remove failure





Conclusion and Future work
This work introduced an implementation of an Eventually Perfect Failure Detector for a
High Available system based on the fundamental theories and its integration with a proxy
and database instances.
The initial effort was put in the conception of a High Available architecture for database
access through a proxy. First benchmarks on the proposed architecture had shown that,
by using a proxy, the performance could increase with the number of dedicated primaries
(write) and secondaries (read) databases and paralelization of client transactions.
Implementation of the failure detector had a modular design, aiming to facilitate later
addition of different kinds of communication channels, probes and timeout strategies for
the heartbeat and suspicion phase.
Further testing had shown that the failure detector, when added to the architecture,
increased the availability of the systems as failed nodes were dynamically removed or
added in case of becoming functional again, thus masking, when possible, a database
failure to the application accessing it.
In conclusion, by running the initial benchmarks and integrating the failure detector
to it shows evidence that (i) performance could be considerably improved by replicating
the number of database instances to read and write from, and (ii) using a failure detector
helps with the availability in case of database failures.
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For future work, besides refactoring and simplifying the failure detector source code,
the replication logic could be also implemented by the proxy layer through a cache mech-
anism and more tests should be done with sharding databases in order to check if consis-
tency and performance improvements happens in such complex cases as well.
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This appendix presents all the relevant configuration files that were used on the software
tools used through the lifetime of this project.
A.1 OLTPBenchmark configuration file for TPCC
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<parameters>







<!-- Scale factor is the number of warehouses in TPCC -->
<scalefactor>100</scalefactor>








































innodb_buffer_pool_instances = 3 # Use 1 instance per 1GB of InnoDB pool size









































Listing 2: MariaDB server configuration file
A3
